What do these invasions teach us about the state of our geopolitical system?
When the US invaded Iraq, it certainly contravened international legal norms that provided for aggression only when an enemy presented an immediate threat. This is a norm that the US helped to enshrine in the post-World War II legal order. We have witnessed, since the fall of the Soviet Union, a strengthening of the social and economic order promulgated by, and beneficial to, the US: democracy and free markets. The process of the US invasion of Iraq and its aftermath involves a negation of the legal order of the era of Pax Americana but an affirmation of the era’s social and economic order. In short, the US undermined the international legal system while strengthening the international social system.
Russia’s invasion of Georgia, however, represents a challenge both to the international legal order and to the socioeconomic order of US-led globalization. In Iraq, we ultimately seem to be witnessing the triumph of the liberal economic and political order. The ability, or inability, of that socioeconomic order to prevail in Georgia is of great symbolic significance over the next few years.
The US invasion of Iraq was, if you will, a wager in which the socioeconomic order of international democracy was chosen over the international norm of national sovereignty. It is not surprising that US disregard for the latter is costing us right now. Still, we would be foolish to be entranced by that fact and to overlook the greater stakes that underpinned the initial wager. The pace of the march of political and economic freedom around the world is at stake.
Friday, August 15, 2008
GEORGIA ON MY MIND, or WHY THE INVASION MATTERS SO MUCH
International aggression and ethnic separatism are important elements of this crisis but they do not lend it its singularity. Russia, an important global power, is announcing its refusal to align itself to a US-led global system that tends to support economic and political freedom.
Paul Krugman explains (though perhaps a bit too defnitively for my tastes):
Some have asked, “Didn’t the American-created global order suffer a greater defeat with the invasion of Iraq?” or “How is the Russian support of South Ossetian independence different from the US support of Kosovar independence?”
The US invasion of Iraq does have consequences for the stability of the international system. It does make it harder for the US to assert the importance of respecting national sovereignty. But, it did not alter the fundamental fact that the US economy, society, and culture tend to see their interests aligned with politically and economically free societies ruled by law. No one is surprised that, following the increasing democratic stability in Iraq, the US is getting ready to leave. No one is surprised that the US is helping to support a free society in Kosovo. Russia cannot be expected to act similarly.
Paul Krugman explains (though perhaps a bit too defnitively for my tastes):
[T]he war in Georgia [marks] the end of the Pax Americana — the era in which the United States more or less maintained a monopoly on the use of military force. And that raises some real questions about the future of globalization.
Some have asked, “Didn’t the American-created global order suffer a greater defeat with the invasion of Iraq?” or “How is the Russian support of South Ossetian independence different from the US support of Kosovar independence?”
The US invasion of Iraq does have consequences for the stability of the international system. It does make it harder for the US to assert the importance of respecting national sovereignty. But, it did not alter the fundamental fact that the US economy, society, and culture tend to see their interests aligned with politically and economically free societies ruled by law. No one is surprised that, following the increasing democratic stability in Iraq, the US is getting ready to leave. No one is surprised that the US is helping to support a free society in Kosovo. Russia cannot be expected to act similarly.
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
Tuesday, August 05, 2008
THE MEANING OF THE INFORMATION AGE
This is my most extensive political theory work to date. It may be a bit rough around the edges but I hope that you will find it interesting. I am hoping that it will impress but even more so, that you will be inspired to offer me criticism and guidance.
Labels:
capitalism,
China,
democracy,
economy,
education,
environment,
Europe,
Iraq,
public health,
US,
US economy
THE SADR MILITIA ANNOUNCES THAT IT WILL DISARM
From Pete Wehner:
I supported the war and was hesitant and nervous about the surge. I respect the position of war opponents. Still, are there any such opponents out there who will celebrate these salutary developments in Iraq?
From Pete Wehner:
What we are witnessing unfold in Iraq will one day be written about in history books, and not just military history books. To have taken a situation critics said was a mistake of historic proportions–the worst foreign policy debacle since the founding of the Republic–and to transform it into a victory, which is what is well under way, is among the more dramatic and important moments in American history. These have been exhausting years for our nation, ones during which tremendous errors in judgment were made. But they have been memorable and proud ones as well. And now, we can say with increasing confidence, they have been successful ones.
I supported the war and was hesitant and nervous about the surge. I respect the position of war opponents. Still, are there any such opponents out there who will celebrate these salutary developments in Iraq?
"Obama, the postmodernist"
by Jonah Goldberg
I don't entirely agree with the tone and the perspective but I think that the main thrust of the argument is quite correct and is worth consideration before you cast your vote. Any postmodernists out there who care to offer their two cents?
by Jonah Goldberg
I don't entirely agree with the tone and the perspective but I think that the main thrust of the argument is quite correct and is worth consideration before you cast your vote. Any postmodernists out there who care to offer their two cents?
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
"Are America’s Elites Post-American?" and Other Implied Questions of a Rambling Monologue
I admit that I'm throwing these thoughts at you, dear reader. Much can be more tightly defined and/or more broadly spun out. I'd love your feedback: What message do you discern from these expatiations?
The confrontation of non-democratic powers reinforces our belief that we need to dynamic, flexible, and largely unconstrained by governmental regulation. The self-interested reason that elites sometimes support social programs is that they believe in the strengthening of the nation-state, in this context.
The intermingling of elites, however, has undermined the sense that the future of elites is tied to the common person. At the same time, the common American supports the status quo because of a belief in the need to confront regimes that are less free, and potentially aggressive.
Peaceful accommodation among elites may eventually lead to the perception that aggressive confrontation is not strongly needed and the common person may decide that it is worthwhile to secure health and educational benefits for himself.
Trade agreements are one step in the direction of events such as these unfolding. More significant, however, would be (1) the democratization of China and (2a) the democratization of important parts of the Middle East or (2b) a dramatic decrease in our reliance on oil (NB: 2a and 2b do not both need to happen for the belief in a stable, wealthy world to take root much more firmly.). Such an occurrence (which would likely take decades to solidify itself) would convince common folks that the need to band behind their elite leadership is not so strong as it had earlier seemed.
Obama is an interesting phenomenon because he senses the potential for such a secure, wealthy world order to emerge. He simultaneously seems to support the passions of common folks to secure their part of an international system that does not fully consider them. This is a common liberal stance in American today. Obama is so successful because he presents it with so little acrimony. The image is understandably appealing.
The shortcoming is that, so long as challenges to the democratic world order are not taken seriously, the risks remain of (1) an ebb in the tide of democratic expansion and/or (2) a crisis in the relationship between Obama and American middle in the event of future challenges to that order.
I admit that I'm throwing these thoughts at you, dear reader. Much can be more tightly defined and/or more broadly spun out. I'd love your feedback: What message do you discern from these expatiations?
The confrontation of non-democratic powers reinforces our belief that we need to dynamic, flexible, and largely unconstrained by governmental regulation. The self-interested reason that elites sometimes support social programs is that they believe in the strengthening of the nation-state, in this context.
The intermingling of elites, however, has undermined the sense that the future of elites is tied to the common person. At the same time, the common American supports the status quo because of a belief in the need to confront regimes that are less free, and potentially aggressive.
Peaceful accommodation among elites may eventually lead to the perception that aggressive confrontation is not strongly needed and the common person may decide that it is worthwhile to secure health and educational benefits for himself.
Trade agreements are one step in the direction of events such as these unfolding. More significant, however, would be (1) the democratization of China and (2a) the democratization of important parts of the Middle East or (2b) a dramatic decrease in our reliance on oil (NB: 2a and 2b do not both need to happen for the belief in a stable, wealthy world to take root much more firmly.). Such an occurrence (which would likely take decades to solidify itself) would convince common folks that the need to band behind their elite leadership is not so strong as it had earlier seemed.
Obama is an interesting phenomenon because he senses the potential for such a secure, wealthy world order to emerge. He simultaneously seems to support the passions of common folks to secure their part of an international system that does not fully consider them. This is a common liberal stance in American today. Obama is so successful because he presents it with so little acrimony. The image is understandably appealing.
The shortcoming is that, so long as challenges to the democratic world order are not taken seriously, the risks remain of (1) an ebb in the tide of democratic expansion and/or (2) a crisis in the relationship between Obama and American middle in the event of future challenges to that order.
Labels:
China,
democracy,
foreign policy,
Middle East,
Obama,
oil,
US
Tuesday, July 29, 2008
Brooks on Education and Technology
David Brooks makes the following point today:
I find this point convincing at first glance. It begs the question: How do we promote educational investment at a time at which we are hypnotized (often very justifiably) by technological development? Do we fear sacrificing the latter for the former?
Brooks also argues, however, that the principal reason for America's role as a 20th century superpower was "a ferocious belief that people have the power to transform their own lives gave Americans an unparalleled commitment to education, hard work and economic freedom." I am inclined to think that the aforementioned is just one aspect of a propitious brew that included prolific natural resources and an ambitious (that is, not just educationally/intellectually ambitious) and entrepreneurial populace, inter alia.
David Brooks makes the following point today:
In periods when educational progress outpaces this change, inequality narrows. The market is flooded with skilled workers, so their wages rise modestly. In periods, like the current one, when educational progress lags behind technological change, inequality widens. The relatively few skilled workers command higher prices, while the many unskilled ones have little bargaining power.
I find this point convincing at first glance. It begs the question: How do we promote educational investment at a time at which we are hypnotized (often very justifiably) by technological development? Do we fear sacrificing the latter for the former?
Brooks also argues, however, that the principal reason for America's role as a 20th century superpower was "a ferocious belief that people have the power to transform their own lives gave Americans an unparalleled commitment to education, hard work and economic freedom." I am inclined to think that the aforementioned is just one aspect of a propitious brew that included prolific natural resources and an ambitious (that is, not just educationally/intellectually ambitious) and entrepreneurial populace, inter alia.
Friday, July 25, 2008
A EUROPEAN'S TAKE ON OBAMA AND AMERICA
"Eventually, We'll All Hate Obama[,] Too"
Despite the provocative title, this piece is not meant to bash Obama. Rather, the purpose is to highligh some fundamental divisions between American and European perspectives that are likely to challenge any future administration.
"Eventually, We'll All Hate Obama[,] Too"
Despite the provocative title, this piece is not meant to bash Obama. Rather, the purpose is to highligh some fundamental divisions between American and European perspectives that are likely to challenge any future administration.
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
OBAMA ON TERROR
From today's Washington Post:
What's going on here? Obama's stances are based on electoral politicas and are delimited by the moral stances of the left regarding the initial justice of the two respective wars. The left is generally uninterested in a geopoltical analysis of the current security needs of Afghanistan or Iraq. The justice, or injustice of the inception of each war is enough to guide the general strategic thinking from certain quarters.
I respect the moral judgments of many who proclaim the legitimacy of the Afghanistan war over the Iraq wars. There are many sounds reasons uppon which to base such an argument. Such judgments do not an indefinite policy make. I am reminded of a favorite Max Weber quotation that states, regarding political action, "it is not true that good can follow only from good and evil only from evil, but that often the opposite is true. Anyone who fails to see this is, indeed, a political infant."
From today's Washington Post:
Mr. Obama's account of his strategic vision remains eccentric. He insists that Afghanistan is "the central front" for the United States, along with the border areas of Pakistan. But there are no known al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan, and any additional U.S. forces sent there would not be able to operate in the Pakistani territories where Osama bin Laden is headquartered. While the United States has an interest in preventing the resurgence of the Afghan Taliban, the country's strategic importance pales beside that of Iraq, which lies at the geopolitical center of the Middle East and contains some of the world's largest oil reserves.
What's going on here? Obama's stances are based on electoral politicas and are delimited by the moral stances of the left regarding the initial justice of the two respective wars. The left is generally uninterested in a geopoltical analysis of the current security needs of Afghanistan or Iraq. The justice, or injustice of the inception of each war is enough to guide the general strategic thinking from certain quarters.
I respect the moral judgments of many who proclaim the legitimacy of the Afghanistan war over the Iraq wars. There are many sounds reasons uppon which to base such an argument. Such judgments do not an indefinite policy make. I am reminded of a favorite Max Weber quotation that states, regarding political action, "it is not true that good can follow only from good and evil only from evil, but that often the opposite is true. Anyone who fails to see this is, indeed, a political infant."
Tuesday, July 22, 2008
ALEXANDER THE GREAT
I'm reading the classic source on Alexander the Great's campaigns, "Anabasis Alexandri" by the first century Greek historian known as Arrian. The account, with a military focus but many key personal elements, is sometimes riveting, sometimes dry but quite reflective and highly articulate. At the very least, it impresses one with the richness of first century literature.
Here's a scenario to chew on:
+Alexander and his troops are on the march, somewhat isolated, in Asia.
+Alexander uncovers a plot against him.
+One of the participants in the plot is the son of one of Alexander's generals.
+Alexander has the son killed.
+Alexander has the father killed, possibly because he does not want to risk the father's wrath against himself.
What would you have done if you were to have been Alexander?
I'm reading the classic source on Alexander the Great's campaigns, "Anabasis Alexandri" by the first century Greek historian known as Arrian. The account, with a military focus but many key personal elements, is sometimes riveting, sometimes dry but quite reflective and highly articulate. At the very least, it impresses one with the richness of first century literature.
Here's a scenario to chew on:
+Alexander and his troops are on the march, somewhat isolated, in Asia.
+Alexander uncovers a plot against him.
+One of the participants in the plot is the son of one of Alexander's generals.
+Alexander has the son killed.
+Alexander has the father killed, possibly because he does not want to risk the father's wrath against himself.
What would you have done if you were to have been Alexander?
OBAMA AND ISRAEL
This is my first post about Israel but I think that Nathan Diament frames very well the major questions of Israelis and Jews, writ large, on the eve of Obama's visit to Israel.
This is my first post about Israel but I think that Nathan Diament frames very well the major questions of Israelis and Jews, writ large, on the eve of Obama's visit to Israel.
OBAMA THE CULTURAL PHENOMENON
Shelby Steele brilliantly analyzes the Obama candidacy today.
To sum up Steele's most salient points:
1) The most salutary effects of an Obama election are cultural in that his cultural stance would allow us to move beyond a large part of the politically correct conversation on race. The caveat is that a failed Obama presidency would not accomplish this. Obama's rhetoric, I would add, implicitly acknowledges this truth. Jonathan Stein in Mother Jones shares this related thought that substantiates the idea that Obama is well aware of this aspect of his candidacy:
2) Obama's amorphous politics perfectly suit his being such a cultural phenomenon. His lack of hard political commitments is his charm, in this context.
3) As long as Obama makes the election about cultural attitudes and makes political differences seem unimportant, McCain will epitomize "retrogression" and the election will be about "the establishment of his own patriotism, trustworthiness and gravitas."
Shelby Steele brilliantly analyzes the Obama candidacy today.
To sum up Steele's most salient points:
1) The most salutary effects of an Obama election are cultural in that his cultural stance would allow us to move beyond a large part of the politically correct conversation on race. The caveat is that a failed Obama presidency would not accomplish this. Obama's rhetoric, I would add, implicitly acknowledges this truth. Jonathan Stein in Mother Jones shares this related thought that substantiates the idea that Obama is well aware of this aspect of his candidacy:
"Obama's rhetoric makes an undeniable suggestion: that his election, not an eight-year administration that shttp://www.blogger.com/img/gl.link.gifuccessfully implements his vision for America, would represent a moment in America of the grandest, most transformative kind. And that's a bit much."
2) Obama's amorphous politics perfectly suit his being such a cultural phenomenon. His lack of hard political commitments is his charm, in this context.
3) As long as Obama makes the election about cultural attitudes and makes political differences seem unimportant, McCain will epitomize "retrogression" and the election will be about "the establishment of his own patriotism, trustworthiness and gravitas."
Wednesday, July 16, 2008
WHAT I LOVE ABOUT AMERICAN POWER
Please consider reading this if you are queasy about American power in the world (Friedman today on Zimbabwe).
Please consider reading this if you are queasy about American power in the world (Friedman today on Zimbabwe).
Thursday, July 10, 2008
WATER, WATER, EVERYWHERE
It strikes me lately how promising a subject of public health research is the topic of water. Algae blooms off the coast of China, pollution in the Yellow River, contaminants (medications, pesticides, etc.) in our our drinking water, etc., etc. This is an issue in the developing world as well as the developed world.
It strikes me lately how promising a subject of public health research is the topic of water. Algae blooms off the coast of China, pollution in the Yellow River, contaminants (medications, pesticides, etc.) in our our drinking water, etc., etc. This is an issue in the developing world as well as the developed world.
Monday, June 30, 2008
FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY
+ Sam Ruteikara argues that American attitudes about sex, in so far as they influence foreign aid policy, have undermined the Ugandan effort to fight AIDS. This is not the traditional critique (that pro-abstinence policymakers undermine condom distribution, sex education, etc.). Rather, Ruteikara argues that an American bias towards accepting casual sex has undermined Uganda's efforts to discourage the same.
+Gregory Scoblete suggests that we consider Obama and McCain's foreign policy in terms of their particularist and universalist tendencies, respectively. More specifically, how generalizable do they each believe American values to be? These positions do not easily correlate with the hawk vs. dove paradigm.
+ Sam Ruteikara argues that American attitudes about sex, in so far as they influence foreign aid policy, have undermined the Ugandan effort to fight AIDS. This is not the traditional critique (that pro-abstinence policymakers undermine condom distribution, sex education, etc.). Rather, Ruteikara argues that an American bias towards accepting casual sex has undermined Uganda's efforts to discourage the same.
+Gregory Scoblete suggests that we consider Obama and McCain's foreign policy in terms of their particularist and universalist tendencies, respectively. More specifically, how generalizable do they each believe American values to be? These positions do not easily correlate with the hawk vs. dove paradigm.
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