Posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Friday, March 12, 2010
Sunday, January 24, 2010
Google vs. China, and America vs. Itself
Google’s confrontation with China over the freedom of access to information may evoke feelings of both moral and commercial satisfaction for residents of the free market West: Google simultaneously stands in for our disdain for Chinese political repression and for that country’s shortsighted understanding of the economic value of free information flows.
Tom Friedman suggests that a Chinese internal struggle, between “Network China” and “Command China” defines this dispute and may indicate something about the future of that country.
However we may frame it, the conflict should evoke for us as much introspection as satisfaction: We, too, currently struggle themselves to come to terms with the concept of “economy as network”: “a world in which the focus of value creation is effective participation in knowledge flows, which are constantly being renewed.”
Those who stand at the margins of this transformation call forth libertarian slogans in order to evoke a feeling of defiant individualism. They do not understand the dynamic of an economic system that demands the nurturing of relationships and the renewal of knowledge and that suggests that individualism does not flourish in a social vacuum. The more pragmatic brand of economic individualism favored by Wall Street lost all credibility in late 2008, of course, when financiers acknowledged their own dependence on the broader American social network.
Misunderstandings about the changing nature of our economy clearly extend beyond the right-wing: Democrats evince characteristic eagerness to conflate moral and economic arguments as they address needed health and energy reform. They thereby demonstrate a lack of seriousness with regard to the limited role the American state can play in correcting an economy newly susceptible to international capital flows and increasing foreign competition: America must enhance its ability to compete internationally if it is to address its social challenges sustainably.
We, just like the Chinese, require a new relationship to government for 21st century success. The old metaphor of government as a command center, whether encouraged by old guard communist leaders or well-meaning American reformers, or whether opposed by libertarians, no longer suffices. Government at its best will act as a node that has the potential either to complement or to hinder the flourishing of both domestic and international relationships. Understanding this reality, rather than adhering to old nostrums, will give us the greater measure of moral and commercial clarity.
Tom Friedman suggests that a Chinese internal struggle, between “Network China” and “Command China” defines this dispute and may indicate something about the future of that country.
However we may frame it, the conflict should evoke for us as much introspection as satisfaction: We, too, currently struggle themselves to come to terms with the concept of “economy as network”: “a world in which the focus of value creation is effective participation in knowledge flows, which are constantly being renewed.”
Those who stand at the margins of this transformation call forth libertarian slogans in order to evoke a feeling of defiant individualism. They do not understand the dynamic of an economic system that demands the nurturing of relationships and the renewal of knowledge and that suggests that individualism does not flourish in a social vacuum. The more pragmatic brand of economic individualism favored by Wall Street lost all credibility in late 2008, of course, when financiers acknowledged their own dependence on the broader American social network.
Misunderstandings about the changing nature of our economy clearly extend beyond the right-wing: Democrats evince characteristic eagerness to conflate moral and economic arguments as they address needed health and energy reform. They thereby demonstrate a lack of seriousness with regard to the limited role the American state can play in correcting an economy newly susceptible to international capital flows and increasing foreign competition: America must enhance its ability to compete internationally if it is to address its social challenges sustainably.
We, just like the Chinese, require a new relationship to government for 21st century success. The old metaphor of government as a command center, whether encouraged by old guard communist leaders or well-meaning American reformers, or whether opposed by libertarians, no longer suffices. Government at its best will act as a node that has the potential either to complement or to hinder the flourishing of both domestic and international relationships. Understanding this reality, rather than adhering to old nostrums, will give us the greater measure of moral and commercial clarity.
Thursday, October 16, 2008
Intimations of a New Global Order
David Ignatius:
A focal point of this new order, which I will explain further later, will be the development of the economic potential of the mass of producers. The innovation will be that such focus will be justified in terms of the promotion of prosperity, not just through appeals to social justice.
A few suggested conversation topics:
What positive effects can you imagine coming out of the crisis?
Can democratic institutions respond to crisis with coherence?
What aspect of the financial crisis would you focus on if you were Paulson?
The new interventionism isn't so much socialist as it is Confucian -- a belief that a public-private partnership of the wise ones will get us out of the mess. And if it's any consolation, the Chinese are becoming more like us, even as we are becoming more like them. . . .
One hopeful sign last week was that the Chinese were moving toward private ownership, even as America and Europe were moving away from it. The Chinese government announced a new rural policy aimed at allowing millions of farmers to own the land they have been working. This would create a huge new reserve of private wealth in China, which could power domestic spending and growth. [Read more.]
A focal point of this new order, which I will explain further later, will be the development of the economic potential of the mass of producers. The innovation will be that such focus will be justified in terms of the promotion of prosperity, not just through appeals to social justice.
A few suggested conversation topics:
What positive effects can you imagine coming out of the crisis?
Can democratic institutions respond to crisis with coherence?
What aspect of the financial crisis would you focus on if you were Paulson?
Sunday, October 12, 2008
Iceland and China
. . . the government of Iceland is presiding over a massive default by all the country's major banks. This troubling development points not only to an even more painful recession than anticipated, but also to the urgent need for international coordination to avoid something worse: all-out financial warfare.
. . . Iceland's promise to guarantee domestic depositors while reneging on guarantees to foreigners may be just a first step. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown's decision last week to sue Iceland over this issue may escalate the crisis. The use of counterterrorist legislation to take over Icelandic bank assets and operations in the United Kingdom also has a potentially dramatic symbolic effect. (Peter Boone and Simon Johnson, "The Next World War? It Could Be Financial." The Washington Post, 10/12/08.)
There's a reason that the gestures by the US government have not sufficed to reassure financial markets: the US is no longer the unquestioned command and control center of the global economy. We have to take the imaginative leap that integrates rising developing nations into our paradigm of economic management.
Peter Boone and Simon Johnson, in today's Washington Post, point to the depth of the financial crisis in bracing detail but, unsurprisingly, fall back on nostrums about the power of the "the world's leading financial powers -- at a minimum, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany" to reassure markets. Am I naive, or does US to China (between $1.5 and $2 trillion, I believe) qualify China as an important financier? How can anyone be sure that the Chinese, given their own fragile politics, will support any plan that comes from the West in a time of financial crisis?
Wednesday, October 08, 2008
A Broader Perspective on the Financial Crisis
The response to this financial crisis will be both economic and geopolitical. The Great Depression called into question the stark laissez-faire approach of the industrial revolution and its aftermath. The US stepped into global leadership after World War II by leading the construction of a global financial system that has done a very good job at promoting stability and growth.
The change that we are facing now is not essentially about investment banks, mortgage lenders, or homebuyers. Rather, it reflects the transition of the global economy to an era in which the US cannot be the only hub at the center of the wheel.
C. Fred Bergsten and Arvind Subramanian, in today's Washington Post, help to explain how this process underlies the more obvious signs of crisis.
One way to understand this is that China, most importantly, has artificially increased its capital reserves by preventing its currency from appreciating to its correct market value. China sells more exports than it otherwise would, and buys fewer imports than it otherwise would. Ultimately, the Chinese money does make it back to the US, but in the form of payments for Treasury Bills (This is due to a Chinese concern about inflation as well as a concern that excess capital would lead to social unrest and/or uncontrollable wealth flows that could weaken Communist Party control.).
Simply put, it seems to me that the net consequence is that cash comes to the US Treasury rather than to, among others, US producers. The cash in the Treasury was then ultimately lent out at low interest rates, creating investment opportunities in a society in which wages were not appreciated significantly (because of, among other reasons, the fact that American products were not easily sold to countries that have maintained a high exchange rate of local currency to dollars).
The predicament in which consumers cannot afford appreciating assets in reminiscent of the pre-Depression years in which consumers could not afford proliferating production. The similar increase in consumer credit is an unsurprising result.
Essentially, a change in global financial architecture is needed, not only for the reasons mentioned by the authors, above, but also so that the US can benefit most fully from concentrating on the development of its human capital, the long-term sine qua non for economic growth and political stability.
Concerns about political stability should not be minimized. The inherent tensions between communities constituting a democratic society are generously lubricated by growing wealth. The sense of chaos that can percolate through a society in the absence of such a scenario lends itself to exploitation by authoritarian-minded regimes. I do not think that the US is on the brink of such a scenario but the 20th century taught us well that farflung events can have a dramatic impact on our society.
The change that we are facing now is not essentially about investment banks, mortgage lenders, or homebuyers. Rather, it reflects the transition of the global economy to an era in which the US cannot be the only hub at the center of the wheel.
C. Fred Bergsten and Arvind Subramanian, in today's Washington Post, help to explain how this process underlies the more obvious signs of crisis.
Beyond the short term, countries will need to develop a cooperative framework to prevent and resolve such crises, most urgently within Europe. There is inherent tension as finance becomes global but its regulation remains national. The current crisis originated in the United States but was importantly affected by massive savings surpluses in some countries and the resulting surfeit of liquidity, which drove down interest rates and encouraged irresponsible lending here. Those international imbalances were in turn partly caused by misaligned exchange rates. Global oversight of both financial regulation and currencies can no longer be neglected.
One way to understand this is that China, most importantly, has artificially increased its capital reserves by preventing its currency from appreciating to its correct market value. China sells more exports than it otherwise would, and buys fewer imports than it otherwise would. Ultimately, the Chinese money does make it back to the US, but in the form of payments for Treasury Bills (This is due to a Chinese concern about inflation as well as a concern that excess capital would lead to social unrest and/or uncontrollable wealth flows that could weaken Communist Party control.).
Simply put, it seems to me that the net consequence is that cash comes to the US Treasury rather than to, among others, US producers. The cash in the Treasury was then ultimately lent out at low interest rates, creating investment opportunities in a society in which wages were not appreciated significantly (because of, among other reasons, the fact that American products were not easily sold to countries that have maintained a high exchange rate of local currency to dollars).
The predicament in which consumers cannot afford appreciating assets in reminiscent of the pre-Depression years in which consumers could not afford proliferating production. The similar increase in consumer credit is an unsurprising result.
Essentially, a change in global financial architecture is needed, not only for the reasons mentioned by the authors, above, but also so that the US can benefit most fully from concentrating on the development of its human capital, the long-term sine qua non for economic growth and political stability.
Concerns about political stability should not be minimized. The inherent tensions between communities constituting a democratic society are generously lubricated by growing wealth. The sense of chaos that can percolate through a society in the absence of such a scenario lends itself to exploitation by authoritarian-minded regimes. I do not think that the US is on the brink of such a scenario but the 20th century taught us well that farflung events can have a dramatic impact on our society.
Monday, September 08, 2008
Russia's Antidemocratic Alliance
In the latest, tit-for-tat move between the US and Russia, Russia has announced that it may hold joint naval exercises with Venezuela. This is a clear (though unacknowledged) move to send a message to the US regarding its current naval activities in the Black Sea.
How many similar, anti-US regimes of consequence can the Russians reach out to? One potential step for Russian escalation of their defiance of US hegemony would be to strengthen Russia's ties to Iran. This would cause concern for Russia, though, as it fears Iran's nuclear ambitions and Islamic radicalism. Russia itself has Islamic minority nationalist movements that it sometimes struggles to control.
Fortunately for the West, Russia's connection to Venezuela does not have strong ideological underpinnings. Venezuela, ironically, is now the more 'socialist' of the two countries (Russia's is a brand of state capitalism.) and its brand of demagogic populism is likely to unnerve Russia's more austere leadership.
Another interesting development for the West is that Russia appealed for, but did not receive, support for its Georgia moves, from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whose only other weighty member is China. The Chinese, suspicious of all foreign interventions and protective of the perception of their neutrality, recognize at the same time that the future of their economic system (and of the Communist Party, whose legitimacy rests on economic growth) is tied up with the globalized market system as supported by the United States and the West. Is it possible that a resurgent Russia could, once again, push China closer to the more stable and predictable Western powers?
How many similar, anti-US regimes of consequence can the Russians reach out to? One potential step for Russian escalation of their defiance of US hegemony would be to strengthen Russia's ties to Iran. This would cause concern for Russia, though, as it fears Iran's nuclear ambitions and Islamic radicalism. Russia itself has Islamic minority nationalist movements that it sometimes struggles to control.
Fortunately for the West, Russia's connection to Venezuela does not have strong ideological underpinnings. Venezuela, ironically, is now the more 'socialist' of the two countries (Russia's is a brand of state capitalism.) and its brand of demagogic populism is likely to unnerve Russia's more austere leadership.
Another interesting development for the West is that Russia appealed for, but did not receive, support for its Georgia moves, from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whose only other weighty member is China. The Chinese, suspicious of all foreign interventions and protective of the perception of their neutrality, recognize at the same time that the future of their economic system (and of the Communist Party, whose legitimacy rests on economic growth) is tied up with the globalized market system as supported by the United States and the West. Is it possible that a resurgent Russia could, once again, push China closer to the more stable and predictable Western powers?
Tuesday, August 05, 2008
THE MEANING OF THE INFORMATION AGE
This is my most extensive political theory work to date. It may be a bit rough around the edges but I hope that you will find it interesting. I am hoping that it will impress but even more so, that you will be inspired to offer me criticism and guidance.
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
"Are America’s Elites Post-American?" and Other Implied Questions of a Rambling Monologue
I admit that I'm throwing these thoughts at you, dear reader. Much can be more tightly defined and/or more broadly spun out. I'd love your feedback: What message do you discern from these expatiations?
The confrontation of non-democratic powers reinforces our belief that we need to dynamic, flexible, and largely unconstrained by governmental regulation. The self-interested reason that elites sometimes support social programs is that they believe in the strengthening of the nation-state, in this context.
The intermingling of elites, however, has undermined the sense that the future of elites is tied to the common person. At the same time, the common American supports the status quo because of a belief in the need to confront regimes that are less free, and potentially aggressive.
Peaceful accommodation among elites may eventually lead to the perception that aggressive confrontation is not strongly needed and the common person may decide that it is worthwhile to secure health and educational benefits for himself.
Trade agreements are one step in the direction of events such as these unfolding. More significant, however, would be (1) the democratization of China and (2a) the democratization of important parts of the Middle East or (2b) a dramatic decrease in our reliance on oil (NB: 2a and 2b do not both need to happen for the belief in a stable, wealthy world to take root much more firmly.). Such an occurrence (which would likely take decades to solidify itself) would convince common folks that the need to band behind their elite leadership is not so strong as it had earlier seemed.
Obama is an interesting phenomenon because he senses the potential for such a secure, wealthy world order to emerge. He simultaneously seems to support the passions of common folks to secure their part of an international system that does not fully consider them. This is a common liberal stance in American today. Obama is so successful because he presents it with so little acrimony. The image is understandably appealing.
The shortcoming is that, so long as challenges to the democratic world order are not taken seriously, the risks remain of (1) an ebb in the tide of democratic expansion and/or (2) a crisis in the relationship between Obama and American middle in the event of future challenges to that order.
I admit that I'm throwing these thoughts at you, dear reader. Much can be more tightly defined and/or more broadly spun out. I'd love your feedback: What message do you discern from these expatiations?
The confrontation of non-democratic powers reinforces our belief that we need to dynamic, flexible, and largely unconstrained by governmental regulation. The self-interested reason that elites sometimes support social programs is that they believe in the strengthening of the nation-state, in this context.
The intermingling of elites, however, has undermined the sense that the future of elites is tied to the common person. At the same time, the common American supports the status quo because of a belief in the need to confront regimes that are less free, and potentially aggressive.
Peaceful accommodation among elites may eventually lead to the perception that aggressive confrontation is not strongly needed and the common person may decide that it is worthwhile to secure health and educational benefits for himself.
Trade agreements are one step in the direction of events such as these unfolding. More significant, however, would be (1) the democratization of China and (2a) the democratization of important parts of the Middle East or (2b) a dramatic decrease in our reliance on oil (NB: 2a and 2b do not both need to happen for the belief in a stable, wealthy world to take root much more firmly.). Such an occurrence (which would likely take decades to solidify itself) would convince common folks that the need to band behind their elite leadership is not so strong as it had earlier seemed.
Obama is an interesting phenomenon because he senses the potential for such a secure, wealthy world order to emerge. He simultaneously seems to support the passions of common folks to secure their part of an international system that does not fully consider them. This is a common liberal stance in American today. Obama is so successful because he presents it with so little acrimony. The image is understandably appealing.
The shortcoming is that, so long as challenges to the democratic world order are not taken seriously, the risks remain of (1) an ebb in the tide of democratic expansion and/or (2) a crisis in the relationship between Obama and American middle in the event of future challenges to that order.
Wednesday, July 16, 2008
WHAT I LOVE ABOUT AMERICAN POWER
Please consider reading this if you are queasy about American power in the world (Friedman today on Zimbabwe).
Please consider reading this if you are queasy about American power in the world (Friedman today on Zimbabwe).
Thursday, June 26, 2008
"ECONOMIC TRANSITION AND HEALTH TRANSITION . . ."
I've been reading about China's health care system and came across a study that raises some provocative questions about how economic transition (that is, systemic change in an economy, as opposed to economic growth, per se) affects public health. The paper suggests that China's gradual economic transition (as compared to that of Russia) has led to better health outcomes.
I've been reading about China's health care system and came across a study that raises some provocative questions about how economic transition (that is, systemic change in an economy, as opposed to economic growth, per se) affects public health. The paper suggests that China's gradual economic transition (as compared to that of Russia) has led to better health outcomes.
Thursday, June 19, 2008
PERSONAL NOTES REGARDING ORGANIZATIONS OF INTEREST
+The China Initiative at Harvard's School of Public Health recently caught my eye. I've written to them to set up an infomational interview; will this become my MD/MPH program of choice?
+As I am in the Bay Area this summer, I contacted Kiva, my favorite microloan organizaiton. I am hoping to drop by for a visit.
+I can't remember if I've written about Tom Friedman's piece about Van Jones' environmental outreach work in disadvantaged communities. In any event, I wrote to Green for All (Jones' organization) in nearby Oakland to see if I can volunteer and check out their work.
+The China Initiative at Harvard's School of Public Health recently caught my eye. I've written to them to set up an infomational interview; will this become my MD/MPH program of choice?
+As I am in the Bay Area this summer, I contacted Kiva, my favorite microloan organizaiton. I am hoping to drop by for a visit.
+I can't remember if I've written about Tom Friedman's piece about Van Jones' environmental outreach work in disadvantaged communities. In any event, I wrote to Green for All (Jones' organization) in nearby Oakland to see if I can volunteer and check out their work.
Monday, June 02, 2008
SAN FRANCISCO, PUBLIC HEALTH, CHINA, AND ME
I continue to be committed to writing a political blog. I'm sensing, however, that my blog may take an autobiographical turn.
I feel satisfied with the general exposition of my analysis of current events that has covered these pages over the last several months. I still hope that you will review, and then comment on, my work.
In a hopeful sign, I am engaged in, and/or near, some work that allows me to express some of my political energy in new ways:
+This summer, I will be working with the Berkeley School of Public Health on a range of studies. One of the studies is an evaluation of the health effects of various pollutants on the people in a particular region in China.
I do not expect to be heavily involved in this study but I am excited to learn more about public health issues in China, especially as they relate to environmental contaminants, a dramatically growing problem in that country.
+Apropos of China and of my stay in the Bay Area, recent studies show that Chinese pollution is making its way to this area of the country.
+Finally, I am beginning some work this summer on an environmental program at a Westchester Co., NY synagogue. I will continue that work in the fall.
+As a (perhaps) side note, my studies of Chinese are going strong. I am over halfway through my Level III studies of the Pimsleur Mandarin Chinese tutorial. I expect to cross paths with various teachers (formal and/or informal) over the course of the summer.
As you can tell, various gurglings are supporting my vision of working on public health issues, China, the environment, etc. as I approach my formal studies of medicine in the years ahead.
I look forward to keeping you posted and hope that you will encourage, criticize, question, and/or laud my efforts when you feel moved to do so.
Many thanks,
Barak
I continue to be committed to writing a political blog. I'm sensing, however, that my blog may take an autobiographical turn.
I feel satisfied with the general exposition of my analysis of current events that has covered these pages over the last several months. I still hope that you will review, and then comment on, my work.
In a hopeful sign, I am engaged in, and/or near, some work that allows me to express some of my political energy in new ways:
+This summer, I will be working with the Berkeley School of Public Health on a range of studies. One of the studies is an evaluation of the health effects of various pollutants on the people in a particular region in China.
I do not expect to be heavily involved in this study but I am excited to learn more about public health issues in China, especially as they relate to environmental contaminants, a dramatically growing problem in that country.
+Apropos of China and of my stay in the Bay Area, recent studies show that Chinese pollution is making its way to this area of the country.
+Finally, I am beginning some work this summer on an environmental program at a Westchester Co., NY synagogue. I will continue that work in the fall.
+As a (perhaps) side note, my studies of Chinese are going strong. I am over halfway through my Level III studies of the Pimsleur Mandarin Chinese tutorial. I expect to cross paths with various teachers (formal and/or informal) over the course of the summer.
As you can tell, various gurglings are supporting my vision of working on public health issues, China, the environment, etc. as I approach my formal studies of medicine in the years ahead.
I look forward to keeping you posted and hope that you will encourage, criticize, question, and/or laud my efforts when you feel moved to do so.
Many thanks,
Barak
Thursday, May 22, 2008
CHINA AND DEMOCRACY
... and some hopeful developments in China, from Nicholas Kristof:
... and some hopeful developments in China, from Nicholas Kristof:
"In the aftermath of the great Sichuan earthquake, we’ve seen a hopeful glimpse of China’s future: a more open and self-confident nation, and maybe — just maybe — the birth of grass-roots politics here.
In traveling around China in the days after the quake, I was struck by how the public and the news media initially seized the initiative from the government. Ordinary Chinese are traveling to the quake zone to help move rubble, and tycoons, peasants and even children are reaching into their pockets to donate to the victims.
“I gave 500 yuan,” or about $72, a man told me in the western city of Urumqi. “Eighty percent of the people in my work unit made donations. Everybody wants to help.”
Private Chinese donations have already raised more than $500 million. That kind of bottom-up public spirit is a mark of citizens, not subjects."
Tuesday, May 06, 2008
MORE ON CHINESE NATIONALISM
On the new generation of Chinese nationalists:
Read more.
On the new generation of Chinese nationalists:
Hardly uneducated know-nothings, young nationalists tend to be middle-class urbanites. Far more than rural Chinese, who remain mired in poverty, these urbanites have benefited enormously from the country's three decades of economic growth. They also have begun traveling and working abroad. They can see that Shanghai and Beijing are catching up to Western cities, that Chinese multinationals can compete with the West, and they've lost their awe of Western power.
Many middle-aged Chinese intellectuals are astounded by the differences between them and their younger peers. Academics I know, members of the Tiananmen generation, are shocked by some students' disdain for foreigners and, often, disinterest in liberal concepts such as democratization. University students now tend to prefer business-oriented majors to liberal arts-oriented subjects such as political science. The young Chinese interviewed for a story last fall in Time magazine on the country's "Me Generation" barely discussed democracy or political change in their daily lives.
Read more.
Monday, May 05, 2008
CHINESE NATIONALISMS
From an op-ed in the Washington Post:
This concern is understandable. It is critical, however, that people distinguish among the four types of nationalism in China today to determine how best to pressure the regime to make improvements.
From an op-ed in the Washington Post:
Frequently the past few months, I have been asked about the wisdom of using the Olympics as an opportunity to push China to improve its human rights record. Underlying these questions is a sense that international pressure may have played into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party by triggering nationalist emotions and rallying indignant Chinese people behind the regime.
This concern is understandable. It is critical, however, that people distinguish among the four types of nationalism in China today to determine how best to pressure the regime to make improvements.
Thursday, May 01, 2008
CHINESE OLYMPICS
I think that I'm for a boycott.
Read what Jewish leaders have written on the subject.http://www.blogger.com/img/gl.link.gif
I think that I'm for a boycott.
Read what Jewish leaders have written on the subject.http://www.blogger.com/img/gl.link.gif
Sunday, April 06, 2008
THE AUSTRALIAN PM
I hadn't been expecting to write about Australia. Still, I found this description of the new Prime Minister's foreign policy to be interesting. He seems to me to be on the right track for the decades ahead.
An excerpt:
I hadn't been expecting to write about Australia. Still, I found this description of the new Prime Minister's foreign policy to be interesting. He seems to me to be on the right track for the decades ahead.
An excerpt:
It would be easy to ridicule [Prime Minister Rudd's foreign policy] ambition and it would be wrong. The European portion of Rudd's world tour takes him deep into the second leg of his now famous foreign policy tripod. The American part of the journey represented the first leg of the tripod: the US alliance.
Here Rudd made profoundly important commitments to the US alliance as central to Australian foreign policy, to a view of the US as "overwhelmingly a force for good" in the world, and displayed a warmth to Republican and Democratic leaders alike, which underlined the bipartisan quality of the alliance in both the US and Australia.
Now, in Europe, he displays the second leg of his policy tripod, his commitment to multilateralism and the institutions of global governance.
Next week, in China, we'll get the third leg: deep engagement with Asia.
Monday, March 31, 2008
SPIRIT & INTELLIGENCE
Back to Aristotle, whose profound insight below is colored, unfortunately but not surprisingly, by racialism and some degree of historical determinism:
It may be tough not to focus on the apparent ethnocentrism/racialism/racism in this selection. I think that there is a truth bubbling (at least) right near the surface. This truth involves the fact that strong cultures are undergirded by both intelligence and a strength of spirit. I think that Greece did embody that confluence for a period of time in the ancient world. Aristotle missed the fact that these qualities can grow or, alternatively, degrade, in a particular culture over the course of a period of time (I would even hold that the 'intelligence of a society can grow over time. I'm not referring to evolutionary biology here, but to the fact that the organization and values of a particular society can promote, or diminish, the degree to which intelligence; as opposed to say, ideology, fear, or anger; defines the actions of the society in question.).
The United States has, over the past century, been largely successful at combining intelligence (read here: an appreciation of the role of learning and science in developing a country's institutions) and a strength of spirit (read: innovativeness, an ability to confront societies that do not nurture individual growth Roger Cohen's recent op-ed piece highlights some of the ways in which China, specifically, and Asia, in general, is developing these qualities in a way that should give US citizens pause to consider how true we are being to our own best traits. Namely, are we valuing science enough? Are we concerned enough with innovation and the development of raw talent? Will the weaknesses of our secondary school system undermine our ability to be a world leader in the medium- or long-run?
Back to Aristotle, whose profound insight below is colored, unfortunately but not surprisingly, by racialism and some degree of historical determinism:
The people of cold countries, generally, and particularly those of Europe, are full ofs spirit but deficient in skill in intelligence; and this is why they continue to remain comparitively free, but attain no political development and show no capacity for governing others. The peoples of Asia are endowed with skill and intelligence, but are deficient in spirit; and this is why they continue to be peoples of subjects and slaves. The Greek stock, intermediate in geographical position, unites the qualities of both sets of peoples. It possesses both spirit and intelligence, for which reason it continues to be free, to have the highest political development, and to be capable of governing every other people . . . (Politics, VII, 7: 1327b18ff)
It may be tough not to focus on the apparent ethnocentrism/racialism/racism in this selection. I think that there is a truth bubbling (at least) right near the surface. This truth involves the fact that strong cultures are undergirded by both intelligence and a strength of spirit. I think that Greece did embody that confluence for a period of time in the ancient world. Aristotle missed the fact that these qualities can grow or, alternatively, degrade, in a particular culture over the course of a period of time (I would even hold that the 'intelligence of a society can grow over time. I'm not referring to evolutionary biology here, but to the fact that the organization and values of a particular society can promote, or diminish, the degree to which intelligence; as opposed to say, ideology, fear, or anger; defines the actions of the society in question.).
The United States has, over the past century, been largely successful at combining intelligence (read here: an appreciation of the role of learning and science in developing a country's institutions) and a strength of spirit (read: innovativeness, an ability to confront societies that do not nurture individual growth Roger Cohen's recent op-ed piece highlights some of the ways in which China, specifically, and Asia, in general, is developing these qualities in a way that should give US citizens pause to consider how true we are being to our own best traits. Namely, are we valuing science enough? Are we concerned enough with innovation and the development of raw talent? Will the weaknesses of our secondary school system undermine our ability to be a world leader in the medium- or long-run?
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