"I think health care is a privilege. I wouldn't call it a right." So says Senator Jim DeMint (R-SC) in a recent interview.
This comment is disturbing some liberal commentators. See here and here.
And, yes, the questions raised are essential.
But liberals should pause and realize that the abundant economic wealth that surrounds them makes much more practicable the very idea of "health care as a right." The individualism/individual responsibility that DeMint advocates is an essential element in the growth of wealth that we have witnessed over the past several hundred years. Wealth matters. Individual responsibility matters.
Conservatives should equally consider how mores can evolve, and redound to society's benefit, with new economic and social circumstances. Protections help to make society more stable and help to make less privileged members more productive. Rights matter. Both socially and economically.
One lens for considering the balance between economic growth and civil rights is the historical one:
Namely, rights and protections extended in economically advantageous fashion at one point in economic development might have undermined general economic growth at an earlier time. Had Roman slaves been protected from forced dislocation, as were feudal serfs, the Roman Empire might have been economically undermined in dramatic fashion. Had feudal serfs been extended universal K-12 education as is the common citizen of our time, agricultural output of the period would likely have declined precipitously. By the same token, a commitment to the universal health in our own times may be compatible with strong (more on this adjective later) economic growth even though the costs of such a commitment would have been overwhelming in an earlier time.
Showing posts with label wealth. Show all posts
Showing posts with label wealth. Show all posts
Wednesday, September 02, 2009
Monday, October 27, 2008
End of an Era: Free Market Orthodoxy Is No Longer Ascendant
Agree or not, the following exchange signals the end of a 28-year era of American politics in which free market orthodoxy defined the terms of domestic debate:
Read more.
“You had the authority to prevent irresponsible lending practices that led to the subprime mortgage crisis. You were advised to do so by many others,” said Representative Henry A. Waxman of California, chairman of the committee. “Do you feel that your ideology pushed you to make decisions that you wish you had not made?”
Mr. Greenspan conceded: “Yes, I’ve found a flaw. I don’t know how significant or permanent it is. But I’ve been very distressed by that fact.”
Read more.
Labels:
capitalism,
economy,
finance,
financial crisis,
wealth
Wednesday, October 22, 2008
GEOPOLITICS, FINANCE, AND EDUCATION
In the upcoming weeks, world leaders will meet to begin to consider a new financial architecture for the world.
If they fail to found a cooperative framework, the threat of protectionism, economic decline, and the associated political challenges (which would not be small, and could be frightening) will be our biggest challenges.
If they succeed (as I suspect that they will), we will have taken a noticeable step to a more integrated world in which conflict between large nations becomes somewhat less likely. Challenges would still remain in that regard, to be sure, not least the endurance of petrodictatorships. Still, new issues will, after such a success, begin to come to the fore. I believe that one of the boldest dividing lines in a more stable (I take small group terrorism into account here.), integrated world will be the divide between the information technologically-able and the informational technologically-challenged. The would increase the importance of education, relative to international relations, as a defining issue for geopolitical stability.
What do you think?
If they fail to found a cooperative framework, the threat of protectionism, economic decline, and the associated political challenges (which would not be small, and could be frightening) will be our biggest challenges.
If they succeed (as I suspect that they will), we will have taken a noticeable step to a more integrated world in which conflict between large nations becomes somewhat less likely. Challenges would still remain in that regard, to be sure, not least the endurance of petrodictatorships. Still, new issues will, after such a success, begin to come to the fore. I believe that one of the boldest dividing lines in a more stable (I take small group terrorism into account here.), integrated world will be the divide between the information technologically-able and the informational technologically-challenged. The would increase the importance of education, relative to international relations, as a defining issue for geopolitical stability.
What do you think?
Labels:
capitalism,
cultural divide,
democracy,
economy,
education,
Europe,
finance,
financial crisis,
foreign policy,
globalization,
isolationism,
US,
US economy,
wealth
Thursday, October 16, 2008
"Spread the Wealth Around"
A propos of Obama's comment to a voter that he intends to 'spread the wealth around,' I would suggest that that comment will not prove as incendiary as it may have in an earlier age. For the time being (at least) the federal bailout has broken the US taboo of respect for individual responsibility. In a financial climate that reminds us of our interdependence, the concept that helping those in modest circumstances may be (even financially) beneficial to us all (expressed by Obama, though not as widely reported as his less politic, and less rigorous, statement, above) is not as seditious as it once might have seemed.
Labels:
Democrats,
economy,
election,
finance,
financial crisis,
liberals,
Obama,
US,
US economy,
wealth
Intimations of a New Global Order
David Ignatius:
A focal point of this new order, which I will explain further later, will be the development of the economic potential of the mass of producers. The innovation will be that such focus will be justified in terms of the promotion of prosperity, not just through appeals to social justice.
A few suggested conversation topics:
What positive effects can you imagine coming out of the crisis?
Can democratic institutions respond to crisis with coherence?
What aspect of the financial crisis would you focus on if you were Paulson?
The new interventionism isn't so much socialist as it is Confucian -- a belief that a public-private partnership of the wise ones will get us out of the mess. And if it's any consolation, the Chinese are becoming more like us, even as we are becoming more like them. . . .
One hopeful sign last week was that the Chinese were moving toward private ownership, even as America and Europe were moving away from it. The Chinese government announced a new rural policy aimed at allowing millions of farmers to own the land they have been working. This would create a huge new reserve of private wealth in China, which could power domestic spending and growth. [Read more.]
A focal point of this new order, which I will explain further later, will be the development of the economic potential of the mass of producers. The innovation will be that such focus will be justified in terms of the promotion of prosperity, not just through appeals to social justice.
A few suggested conversation topics:
What positive effects can you imagine coming out of the crisis?
Can democratic institutions respond to crisis with coherence?
What aspect of the financial crisis would you focus on if you were Paulson?
Labels:
capitalism,
China,
Confucianism,
economy,
finance,
financial crisis,
US,
US economy,
wealth
Tuesday, March 04, 2008
WEALTH, CAPITALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND INTERNATIONAL ASSERTIVENESS
My thinking about China and my reading of Alan Greenspan's new book ("The Age of Turbulence") has led me to some conjectures about democracy, capitalism, wealth, and assertive power.
I want to propose the following:
+Countries that are capitalist and wealthy tend very strongly to be democratic and internationally assertive. The converse tends to be true as well.
My reasoning:
+Capitalist countries tend to promote an ethic of individualism, which lends itself to democratic political organization and to a sensitivity to international threats. The second point is, perhaps, the more subtle one: I would argue that the 'rough and tumble' world of capitalism keeps its participants more keen to competitive challenges. This principle applies equally to business challenges and to geopolitical challenges. Essentially, this could be one explanation for the more internationally assertive stance of the UK, the US, and Australia, as opposed to France, Germany, and Japan.
+Wealth affords people the opportunity to reflect upon, and oppose, policies that are perceived to be unfair. Also, of course, wealth affords countries the opportunity to play a globally assertive role.
Some exceptions:
+Singapore and Hong Kong are both wealthy and economically free but lack political freedoms. This imbalance may be sustainable, in part, because of their small size. In short, it may be easier to control the political expression of a small, as opposed to a large, merchant society.
+India is an interesting exception. It is neither wealthy nor particularly economically free. Still, it shows some signs of appreciating the importance of confronting geopolitical challenges from less free neighbors. This may be due to (1) India's large size, which makes it both more able to play a regional/geopolitical role and more conscious of its geopolitical weight and to (2) the very fact of the existence of potentially aggressive, less free neighbors, especially Pakistan and China. We am forced to ask: Why is Japan then different from India? It is both relatively large and in the proximity of a neighbor who presents some degree of geopolitical challenge (read: China). If we argue that Japan's history (and constitution) make it especially inclined to pacifism, we are forced to question the assumption that less economic freedom is the proximate cause of Japan's (and, similarly, of Germany's) relative international quietude.
Conclusion:
There is still some more sorting to do on these issues. India is clearly an interesting case for further investigation.
My thinking about China and my reading of Alan Greenspan's new book ("The Age of Turbulence") has led me to some conjectures about democracy, capitalism, wealth, and assertive power.
I want to propose the following:
+Countries that are capitalist and wealthy tend very strongly to be democratic and internationally assertive. The converse tends to be true as well.
My reasoning:
+Capitalist countries tend to promote an ethic of individualism, which lends itself to democratic political organization and to a sensitivity to international threats. The second point is, perhaps, the more subtle one: I would argue that the 'rough and tumble' world of capitalism keeps its participants more keen to competitive challenges. This principle applies equally to business challenges and to geopolitical challenges. Essentially, this could be one explanation for the more internationally assertive stance of the UK, the US, and Australia, as opposed to France, Germany, and Japan.
+Wealth affords people the opportunity to reflect upon, and oppose, policies that are perceived to be unfair. Also, of course, wealth affords countries the opportunity to play a globally assertive role.
Some exceptions:
+Singapore and Hong Kong are both wealthy and economically free but lack political freedoms. This imbalance may be sustainable, in part, because of their small size. In short, it may be easier to control the political expression of a small, as opposed to a large, merchant society.
+India is an interesting exception. It is neither wealthy nor particularly economically free. Still, it shows some signs of appreciating the importance of confronting geopolitical challenges from less free neighbors. This may be due to (1) India's large size, which makes it both more able to play a regional/geopolitical role and more conscious of its geopolitical weight and to (2) the very fact of the existence of potentially aggressive, less free neighbors, especially Pakistan and China. We am forced to ask: Why is Japan then different from India? It is both relatively large and in the proximity of a neighbor who presents some degree of geopolitical challenge (read: China). If we argue that Japan's history (and constitution) make it especially inclined to pacifism, we are forced to question the assumption that less economic freedom is the proximate cause of Japan's (and, similarly, of Germany's) relative international quietude.
Conclusion:
There is still some more sorting to do on these issues. India is clearly an interesting case for further investigation.
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