The Future of Our Political Parties

I predicted, after 9/11, that the political parties in the US would fundamentally reconstitute themselves. 9/11 demanded an acknowledgment of an interconnected world in which the political organization of other countries, as well as non-Americans’ perceptions of us, were to be of vital consequence.

Bush won the day because he was the only one to present a coherent argument for American engagement in a connected world: Namely, America must reshape the world in its own image.

Obama’s argument for pragmatic flexibility, paired with his symbolic internationalism, gave heft to vague calls made by John Kerry in 2004 for ‘multilateralism;’ working with, and learning from, the rest of the world was now an affirmative act of engagement rather than a retreat from American principles: We were to engage the world with a willingness to adapt. This argument, of course, resonated more strongly in the absence of the perception of immediate threats from terrorists.

The economic crisis of the past year, too, supported Obama’s argument for increased American flexibility: how could we claim to know what is best for the entire world when our cherished capitalist system was mired in such a quandary?

Finally, Obama’s careful management of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, not in accord with the speedy withdrawals originally called for during the Democratic primaries, has robbed the Republican Party, even further, of a potentially affirmative, internationalist message: that of the United States bringing democracy to the world. The GOP’s impulse to take on the world reverts, accordingly, to a shallow xenophobia and isolationism.

Bush and Obama share (and the fact of their sharing anything is surely disturbing to many) a conviction that the world is increasingly intertwined. Each built a political persona based on that idea. All those who reject contending with this emerging reality are left to make increasingly ideological claims with little empirical backing and to entertain the least reality-based members of their political tribe. It is clear which party follows these patterns today.

If Obama leads the Democrats to a principled, if much more cautious and less violent, promotion of democracy around the world, and couples it with enhanced American flexibility on a range of other international issues, the Democrats will have stolen the center for a good time to come. Few constructive messages for the GOP will therefore remain and the party will accordingly continue to wither.

Why is the Health Care Debate Happening Now?

Because a Democrat is in the White House?

Because health care costs have skyrocketed?

Because free marketed ideologies have been discredited by the financial crisis?

Because Obama is especially charming?

The principal reason these debates are happening now is none of these things. The sea change in public opinion on health care over the past few decades is a result of the international predominance of capitalism and democracy.

Sound crazy?

During the Cold War, for instance, Americans were much more sensitive about socialist reforms. Now, a minority of Americans expresses such concerns.

At the same time, the idea of taking a huge economic risk in the midst of a focus on international political competition with, say, the Soviet Union or Islamic fundamentalists, was extremely frightening.

Finally, of course, the focus on human development has grown with the increase in the value of human capital in the global economy.

So, the global triumph of capitalism and democracy has (1) reduced ideological sensitivity, (2) shifted our focus away from international political competition, and (3) created the conditions for international economic competition, based on human capital investment, to take on increasing importance.

The Truth

Tm Friedman:

While the Lebanese deserve 95 percent of the credit for this election, 5 percent goes to two U.S. presidents. As more than one Lebanese whispered to me: Without George Bush standing up to the Syrians in 2005 — and forcing them to get out of Lebanon after the Hariri killing — this free election would not have happened. Mr. Bush helped create the space. Power matters. Mr. Obama helped stir the hope. Words also matter.

Foreign Policy Prediction

Obama's cool veneer on foreign policy issues still hasn't been matched by a convincing agenda: "Be gentler and wiser." does not a strategy make, even when paired with a great deal of detailed knowledge.

I have enough confidence in Obama to believe that he is capable of coming around to a progressive, but realistic strategy. The question is: How much pain will intervene? Furthermore, foreign policy difficulties could be the specter that haunts the Obama administration: It all depends on Obama's learning curve and the pace of world events.

My prediction is that Obama will eventually come around to a global stabilization policy that rests on stronger concerted action between democracies. He could certainly accomplish this, if he wished to, while maintaining the least combative stance possible towards authoritarian regimes.

My instincts tell me that Obama's conciliatory nature, and Democratic biases, will lead him to favor gentle diplomacy with rogue regimes. I suspect that this will bear some fruit but that it will also encourage some destabilization: some nations will be encouraged by Obama's caution. The logic of democratic convergence will eventually make itself clear and Obama will be capable of discerning as much. Will it be too late for him? I hope and suspect not but cannot rule out the possibility.

GEOPOLITICS, FINANCE, AND EDUCATION

In the upcoming weeks, world leaders will meet to begin to consider a new financial architecture for the world.

If they fail to found a cooperative framework, the threat of protectionism, economic decline, and the associated political challenges (which would not be small, and could be frightening) will be our biggest challenges.

If they succeed (as I suspect that they will), we will have taken a noticeable step to a more integrated world in which conflict between large nations becomes somewhat less likely. Challenges would still remain in that regard, to be sure, not least the endurance of petrodictatorships. Still, new issues will, after such a success, begin to come to the fore. I believe that one of the boldest dividing lines in a more stable (I take small group terrorism into account here.), integrated world will be the divide between the information technologically-able and the informational technologically-challenged. The would increase the importance of education, relative to international relations, as a defining issue for geopolitical stability.

What do you think?

A Broader Perspective on the Financial Crisis

The response to this financial crisis will be both economic and geopolitical. The Great Depression called into question the stark laissez-faire approach of the industrial revolution and its aftermath. The US stepped into global leadership after World War II by leading the construction of a global financial system that has done a very good job at promoting stability and growth.

The change that we are facing now is not essentially about investment banks, mortgage lenders, or homebuyers. Rather, it reflects the transition of the global economy to an era in which the US cannot be the only hub at the center of the wheel.

C. Fred Bergsten and Arvind Subramanian, in today's Washington Post, help to explain how this process underlies the more obvious signs of crisis.

Beyond the short term, countries will need to develop a cooperative framework to prevent and resolve such crises, most urgently within Europe. There is inherent tension as finance becomes global but its regulation remains national. The current crisis originated in the United States but was importantly affected by massive savings surpluses in some countries and the resulting surfeit of liquidity, which drove down interest rates and encouraged irresponsible lending here. Those international imbalances were in turn partly caused by misaligned exchange rates. Global oversight of both financial regulation and currencies can no longer be neglected.

One way to understand this is that China, most importantly, has artificially increased its capital reserves by preventing its currency from appreciating to its correct market value. China sells more exports than it otherwise would, and buys fewer imports than it otherwise would. Ultimately, the Chinese money does make it back to the US, but in the form of payments for Treasury Bills (This is due to a Chinese concern about inflation as well as a concern that excess capital would lead to social unrest and/or uncontrollable wealth flows that could weaken Communist Party control.).

Simply put, it seems to me that the net consequence is that cash comes to the US Treasury rather than to, among others, US producers. The cash in the Treasury was then ultimately lent out at low interest rates, creating investment opportunities in a society in which wages were not appreciated significantly (because of, among other reasons, the fact that American products were not easily sold to countries that have maintained a high exchange rate of local currency to dollars).

The predicament in which consumers cannot afford appreciating assets in reminiscent of the pre-Depression years in which consumers could not afford proliferating production. The similar increase in consumer credit is an unsurprising result.

Essentially, a change in global financial architecture is needed, not only for the reasons mentioned by the authors, above, but also so that the US can benefit most fully from concentrating on the development of its human capital, the long-term sine qua non for economic growth and political stability.

Concerns about political stability should not be minimized. The inherent tensions between communities constituting a democratic society are generously lubricated by growing wealth. The sense of chaos that can percolate through a society in the absence of such a scenario lends itself to exploitation by authoritarian-minded regimes. I do not think that the US is on the brink of such a scenario but the 20th century taught us well that farflung events can have a dramatic impact on our society.

GEORGIA ON MY MIND, or WHY THE INVASION MATTERS SO MUCH

International aggression and ethnic separatism are important elements of this crisis but they do not lend it its singularity. Russia, an important global power, is announcing its refusal to align itself to a US-led global system that tends to support economic and political freedom.

Paul Krugman explains (though perhaps a bit too defnitively for my tastes):

[T]he war in Georgia [marks] the end of the Pax Americana — the era in which the United States more or less maintained a monopoly on the use of military force. And that raises some real questions about the future of globalization.

Some have asked, “Didn’t the American-created global order suffer a greater defeat with the invasion of Iraq?” or “How is the Russian support of South Ossetian independence different from the US support of Kosovar independence?”

The US invasion of Iraq does have consequences for the stability of the international system. It does make it harder for the US to assert the importance of respecting national sovereignty. But, it did not alter the fundamental fact that the US economy, society, and culture tend to see their interests aligned with politically and economically free societies ruled by law. No one is surprised that, following the increasing democratic stability in Iraq, the US is getting ready to leave. No one is surprised that the US is helping to support a free society in Kosovo. Russia cannot be expected to act similarly.

THE MEANING OF THE INFORMATION AGE

This is my most extensive political theory work to date. It may be a bit rough around the edges but I hope that you will find it interesting. I am hoping that it will impress but even more so, that you will be inspired to offer me criticism and guidance.

THE SADR MILITIA ANNOUNCES THAT IT WILL DISARM

From Pete Wehner:

What we are witnessing unfold in Iraq will one day be written about in history books, and not just military history books. To have taken a situation critics said was a mistake of historic proportions–the worst foreign policy debacle since the founding of the Republic–and to transform it into a victory, which is what is well under way, is among the more dramatic and important moments in American history. These have been exhausting years for our nation, ones during which tremendous errors in judgment were made. But they have been memorable and proud ones as well. And now, we can say with increasing confidence, they have been successful ones.

I supported the war and was hesitant and nervous about the surge. I respect the position of war opponents. Still, are there any such opponents out there who will celebrate these salutary developments in Iraq?

"Are America’s Elites Post-American?" and Other Implied Questions of a Rambling Monologue

I admit that I'm throwing these thoughts at you, dear reader. Much can be more tightly defined and/or more broadly spun out. I'd love your feedback: What message do you discern from these expatiations?

The confrontation of non-democratic powers reinforces our belief that we need to dynamic, flexible, and largely unconstrained by governmental regulation. The self-interested reason that elites sometimes support social programs is that they believe in the strengthening of the nation-state, in this context.

The intermingling of elites, however, has undermined the sense that the future of elites is tied to the common person. At the same time, the common American supports the status quo because of a belief in the need to confront regimes that are less free, and potentially aggressive.

Peaceful accommodation among elites may eventually lead to the perception that aggressive confrontation is not strongly needed and the common person may decide that it is worthwhile to secure health and educational benefits for himself.

Trade agreements are one step in the direction of events such as these unfolding. More significant, however, would be (1) the democratization of China and (2a) the democratization of important parts of the Middle East or (2b) a dramatic decrease in our reliance on oil (NB: 2a and 2b do not both need to happen for the belief in a stable, wealthy world to take root much more firmly.). Such an occurrence (which would likely take decades to solidify itself) would convince common folks that the need to band behind their elite leadership is not so strong as it had earlier seemed.

Obama is an interesting phenomenon because he senses the potential for such a secure, wealthy world order to emerge. He simultaneously seems to support the passions of common folks to secure their part of an international system that does not fully consider them. This is a common liberal stance in American today. Obama is so successful because he presents it with so little acrimony. The image is understandably appealing.

The shortcoming is that, so long as challenges to the democratic world order are not taken seriously, the risks remain of (1) an ebb in the tide of democratic expansion and/or (2) a crisis in the relationship between Obama and American middle in the event of future challenges to that order.

CHINA AND DEMOCRACY

... and some hopeful developments in China, from Nicholas Kristof:

"In the aftermath of the great Sichuan earthquake, we’ve seen a hopeful glimpse of China’s future: a more open and self-confident nation, and maybe — just maybe — the birth of grass-roots politics here.

In traveling around China in the days after the quake, I was struck by how the public and the news media initially seized the initiative from the government. Ordinary Chinese are traveling to the quake zone to help move rubble, and tycoons, peasants and even children are reaching into their pockets to donate to the victims.

“I gave 500 yuan,” or about $72, a man told me in the western city of Urumqi. “Eighty percent of the people in my work unit made donations. Everybody wants to help.”

Private Chinese donations have already raised more than $500 million. That kind of bottom-up public spirit is a mark of citizens, not subjects."

YAY!

I was happy to see specific ideas about expanding NATO in Foreign Affairs magazine. Frequent readers will recognize the resonance of this idea with my refrains about the collective challenges faced by the world's democracies.

A couple of quotes [emph. mine]:

#1

Clearly, NATO is changing. But is it changing enough? If the point of the alliance is no longer territorial defense but bringing together countries with similar values and interests to combat global problems, then NATO no longer needs to have an exclusively transatlantic character. Other democratic countries share NATO's values and many common interests -- including Australia, Brazil, Japan, India, New Zealand, South Africa, and South Korea -- and all of them can greatly contribute to NATO's efforts by providing additional military forces or logistical support to respond to global threats and needs. NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan have benefited greatly from contributions made by non-NATO members. Australia, Japan, and South Korea have sent substantial numbers of troops to Iraq in support of efforts by NATO members to stabilize the country. Together with other non-NATO democracies, such as Brazil, India, and South Africa, they have also contributed significantly to peacekeeping operations around the globe.

#2

Creating a global NATO is not about saving the alliance from obsolescence. The issue is not whether NATO goes out of area or out of business. The issue is how the world's premier international military organization should adapt to the demands of the times in a way that advances the interests not just of the transatlantic community but of a global community of democracies dependent on global stability. Global threats cannot be tackled by a regional organization. NATO has worked well in the past because its founding treaty demands that members be committed both to the political and economic principles underpinning democracy and to the common security challenges faced by the alliance. It would be foolish not to welcome into the alliance other countries that can make the same commitments and help confront new global challenges.

WEALTH, CAPITALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND INTERNATIONAL ASSERTIVENESS

My thinking about China and my reading of Alan Greenspan's new book ("The Age of Turbulence") has led me to some conjectures about democracy, capitalism, wealth, and assertive power.

I want to propose the following:

+Countries that are capitalist and wealthy tend very strongly to be democratic and internationally assertive. The converse tends to be true as well.

My reasoning:

+Capitalist countries tend to promote an ethic of individualism, which lends itself to democratic political organization and to a sensitivity to international threats. The second point is, perhaps, the more subtle one: I would argue that the 'rough and tumble' world of capitalism keeps its participants more keen to competitive challenges. This principle applies equally to business challenges and to geopolitical challenges. Essentially, this could be one explanation for the more internationally assertive stance of the UK, the US, and Australia, as opposed to France, Germany, and Japan.

+Wealth affords people the opportunity to reflect upon, and oppose, policies that are perceived to be unfair. Also, of course, wealth affords countries the opportunity to play a globally assertive role.

Some exceptions:

+Singapore and Hong Kong are both wealthy and economically free but lack political freedoms. This imbalance may be sustainable, in part, because of their small size. In short, it may be easier to control the political expression of a small, as opposed to a large, merchant society.

+India is an interesting exception. It is neither wealthy nor particularly economically free. Still, it shows some signs of appreciating the importance of confronting geopolitical challenges from less free neighbors. This may be due to (1) India's large size, which makes it both more able to play a regional/geopolitical role and more conscious of its geopolitical weight and to (2) the very fact of the existence of potentially aggressive, less free neighbors, especially Pakistan and China. We am forced to ask: Why is Japan then different from India? It is both relatively large and in the proximity of a neighbor who presents some degree of geopolitical challenge (read: China). If we argue that Japan's history (and constitution) make it especially inclined to pacifism, we are forced to question the assumption that less economic freedom is the proximate cause of Japan's (and, similarly, of Germany's) relative international quietude.


Conclusion:

There is still some more sorting to do on these issues. India is clearly an interesting case for further investigation.

The Logic (?) of the US Creed, Democratic Ideals, and Foreign Policy

I was inspired to put this together after reading a report a CNN article about the Rand Corp. review of US policy in Iraq (commissioned by the US Department of Defense). I supported the war in Iraq but feel that the strategy of our struggle against terrorism is unproductively skewed towards military tactics.

I've put together a series of interlinked statements that help to explain why I supported the war and how I think our efforts have gone awry. The arguments are political and social, as well as military [Quotes are taken from CNN quotations from the Rand Corp. report (My apologies for not looking them up myself :)].

Here goes:

(1) Every society depends, for cohesion, on a common sense of mission.
(2) The US creed “that all men are created equal” is one of the central elements to this nation’s sense of mission.
(3) This creed ultimately requires us to respect all people around the world both in terms of (a) the value of the lives and (b) their desire for self-government (Again, these requirement relate back to item #1 and are therefore pragmatic, as much as idealistic requirements.)
(4) The paradox of international politics flows from the fact that there exist authoritarian regimes and movements that can undermine societies that adhere to the ideal of “human equality”; it is not always apparent how to stop these regimes without the use of force. The use of force against these regimes contradicts item #3, the requirement that we respect the dignity of every human life (Namely, when civilians are killed in Afghanistan by US forces, our own faith in our national creed is affected.)
(5) In order to both (a) uphold our international commitments and (b) maintain our national faith in our creed, we must never allow violence to be the dominant aspect of our foreign policy.
(6) Over-reliance on violence also erodes our international relationships and exhausts our forces (which are ultimately supported by the morale and treasure of the nation entire).
(7) The attempt to implant democracy in the Middle East is an important element of the effort to spread democracy around the world. This importance is related to (a) the terrorism that has flowed from that region and (b) yes, the importance of oil to the stability of the geopolitical system.
(8) A recent report from the Rand Corp., commissioned by the US Department of Defense, highlights some ways in which we are over-relying on hard power, as opposed to soft power, in our struggle against terrorism. The report focuses on ways in which the US military is overstretching itself and ways in which we are overlooking the possibility of international cooperation to further our goals (see #6).
(9) The report also emphasizes that "Foreign forces cannot substitute for effective local governments, and they can even weaken their legitimacy," However, "when it comes to building these and other civil capabilities abroad, the United States is alarmingly weak." Therefore, "the federal government will need a dramatic increase in civilian capabilities [and] new organizational arrangements . . ." Such an effort would both (a) support the US military (see items #6 and 8) and would (b) help to spread the creed of the US around the world. Such an effort would also help to resolve the paradox contained in item #4, as it would allow us to promote democracy abroad with less reliance on the use of force.

I recently wrote the article below and am planning to submit it to the Obama HQ in NYC and to my new blog on the Obama website. If Obama embraces the perspective outlined in the article below (not necessarily through my doing, of course), I will embrace his candidacy.

From One Bara(c)k to Another
by Barak Epstein

Barack Obama has gotten off his game lately. His understandable compulsion to respond to the Clinton attacks is jeopardizing his popular image. How can Obama defuse the Clinton claim to sage leadership without playing into the ‘drama of personalities’ that Hillary and Bill have set up for him?

Fundamental economic and geopolitical realities play into Obama’s potential to be a transformative president. Globalization and the emergence of the information age increase the value of collaboration, understanding of global cultures, openness, and authenticity. Obama rode these trends into the national limelight. Now he needs to demonstrate that his political mastery of the Age of Globalization marches hand in hand with his cultural mastery of that same Age.

The pending energy revolution significantly links cultural and political trends of globalization. No other issue offers the opportunity to tap so deeply and simultaneously into the cultural thirst for a sustainable global economy and the economic needs (1) to begin to free us from oil and (2) to retrain Americans for an era in which cheap labor abounds in the rest of the world. Specifically, Obama should spread the gospel of a national science project that can help retrain America’s workers and provide ‘green collar’ jobs while addressing the challenge of climate change.

Amazingly, Obama can also ride the issue of globalization to a more confident and more coherent foreign policy stance. Thus far, Obama’s general expression of openness with regard to foreign policy scarily mirrors John Kerry’s 2004 fuzzy talk about ‘multilateralism’. Of course, an energy revolution would serve the goal of drying up some of the funds authoritarian regimes that impede the continuing spread of democracy and/or promote terrorism. Obama should take all of this a step further to emphasize the new opportunities for cooperation that globalization brings. Specifically, he should express the need to create a League of Democracies that works across continental boundaries to establish a world order that reflects America’s highest ideals as well as its national interests. This concept is symbolic of a foreign policy that is collaborative, as so many Democrats desire, but that is also proactive and truly American. The logic of such a policy has the potential to revolutionize the foreign policy of the Democratic Party.

For Obama to be as transformative as Reagan, his ideas will have to come across as clearly as his good character does. The key to articulating these ideas lies in the very cultural and economic trends that make Obama’s style so inherently appealing. Obama’s style is not entirely convincing as long as he plays the game of ideas according to rules that the Clintons set in the 90’s. Obama is playing a new game but has not announced the new rules yet.