The State of the GOP, or, Why The Tea Party Grew in Recent Years

The bailout of Wall Street demonstrated the centrality of the government to the survival of even the paragons of the market system and accordingly challenged American faith in the correlating ideology. The business wing of the Republican Party could no longer convincingly mount traditional arguments about government non-intervention in (health care) economics and leadership of that party naturally passed to those party members least committed to intellectual integrity.

Global Networks and State Power

In previous posts, I’ve considered the economic and political decentering of the nation-state, the unraveling of free-market orthodoxy in the face of the economic crisis of 2008, and my opinion that our political disarray of recent years emerged from these two factors.

You might fairly ask how I can talk about the decentering of the nation-state after a massive financial bailout and stimulus package, and in the face of major health care legislation. Not to mention the assertive international policy of the Bush years.

I’ll begin my answer by considering a characteristic that all of these phenomena share: That is, they all involve responses to the increasing ability of networked groups of non-state actors to cause disruption on a global scale.

We well understand how 9/11 depended on the ability of a non-state actor to take advantage of networking opportunities provided by new communications and transportation technologies. The neoconservative response, rightly or wrongly (and I still hold, rightly) constituted a serious response to this new reality: the reorganization of hostile societies, they argued, served as a means of policing wayward elements that the US could not control from a distance. Iraqi social patterns would benefit us if they enhanced the relative authority of the moderate, and hopefully growing, middle class: The neoconservative project ultimately depended on a very socially-oriented view of national defense. (Some, obviously, will disagree with the premise that we can alter foreign societies socially. Nonetheless, one would have difficulty disagreeing with the idea that the social constitution of foreign societies bears increasing relevance in an age of weapons of mass destruction, improved communications and transportation, etc.)

The financial crisis of 2008 bears strikingly similar traits to the “terrorism crisis of 2001” in that the networking of housing-purchase decisions across the country created a heretofore unknown interconnection between national housing values. Here again, enhanced communications technologies played a central role: Namely, they allowed financiers to organize nation-wide housing derivatives into unified products and allowed massive pools of capital, from international sources, to overwhelm traditional patterns of home financing. In finance, as in the case of international terrorism, the state confronts a vast web of transactions that it cannot successfully monitor or police. In the case of TARP, as in that of Iraq, middle class wealth and habits reveal themselves as the ballast of a volatile political economy: Specifically in the US case, the middle-class funded bailout of high-stakes financiers, after a crisis created by those same financiers as well as by uneducated homebuyers, suggests that ultimate financial stability does not derive from New York but from the well-being, and education, of the mass of American society.

The US government acted aggressively in Iraq and with regard to the financial crisis. In each case, however, the logic of the events precipitating these actions indicates that state power faces a lasting, and growing, challenge from the power of networks unattended until the moment of crisis. The nature of such networks should fascinate us even more than the loud words and deeds of a superpower.

The End of the American Consensus

We weren't told how to behave that day after 9-11, we just knew. It was right; it was the opposite of what we feel today . . . Are you ready to be the person you were that day after 9-11, on 9-12?

-Glenn Beck, 3/13/09

Wherefore 9/11 nostalgia?

What kind of nostalgia does the memory of 9-12-01 provoke? Why would it be appealing?

The memory of unity, of confronting the world as a coherent American people is clearly part of such romanticism.

The current economic recession, the fear of terrorism, and intensified political partisanship (through the Bush and, now, the Obama years) heighten the appeal of a reassuring unity.


Whence our discord?

But the events themselves (terror attack, economic recession) do not explain all of our unease. Nor does partisanship explain all of our discord.

Rather, 9/11 and the financial meltdown forced us to recognize American vulnerability in new ways and to make decisions that undermined the ideological consensus, predicated on the integrity of nation-states and of markets, that constituted the bulwark of American political life from, at least, World War II until recent years.

Let’s look at the security and economic challenges of recent years to understand how they have punctured this American consensus.


The security challenge: 9/11 demonstrated the limitations of the nation-state system: We learned that the apparently mundane political goings-on in other nation-states are of vital security interest to us even when possess no large conventional army. In other words, we have to pay attention to foreign societies, not just foreign militaries. The Bush Administration’s argument for the Iraq war, love it or hate it, proposed a response to this facet of the security challenge. At the same time, the preemptive Iraq War directly undermined Americans’ faith in the stability and relevance of the international laws undergirding the nation-state system.

The economic challenge: The TARP bailout demonstrated the limitations of our corporate sector as well as our new economic vulnerability: Ultimately, the stabilization of that sector demanded the ‘public insurance’ of our tax dollars. Also, our debt and our trade imbalance demonstrated that the economic goings-on in other nation-states are of vital interest to us. Our large international debt limited our options to respond to the financial crisis and may have contributed (read more here here and here) to it in a number of ways.

In short, events have overwhelmed the ideology that underpinned American political thinking from the end of World War II until recent years: We now have less faith in the international system of nation-states as well as less faith in free market, corporate capitalism.

This ideological disorientation causes the malaise that Glenn Beck now exploits.

Why are there More Independents this Year?

Why did the numbers of independents surge this year? Because neither the Right nor the Left could provide satisfactory answers to the economic crisis: Capitalism, it seemed, could not be left to its own devices without resulting dramatic social repercussions. On the other hand, a nation bridled with great debt could not be depended on to spend its way out of crisis.

The Democrats are ignoring the debt crisis of the future by acting as if spending is the salve for all social wounds. The Republicans are ignoring the financial crisis of last year by blaming Obama for all government actions, including those initiated by Bush; instead, they choose to increase the shrillness of their rhetoric.

The economic crisis did demonstrate that government spending is sometimes necessary to ‘right the national ship.’ But our looming debt should remind us that such spending must be, in the vast majority of cases, a carefully considered economic investment.

The ideologies of the past must give way to a more pragmatic approach to spending and investment that acknowledges the tremendous, but not infinite, power of individualism to drive national growth.

Reasons to Worry

David Smick in the Washington Post:

Pity Barack Obama's economic advisers. The blogs are now demanding their scalps, and Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner and his colleagues face a nasty dilemma: There are no solutions to the banking crisis without extraordinary political and financial risks. Thus, they have adopted a three-pronged approach, delay, delay, delay, in the hope that somebody comes up with a breakthrough.

David Ignatius in the Post:

We're still in the Neville Chamberlain phase when it comes to the economic crisis. The government is talking about sacrifice and solutions, but it hasn't yet made the tough decisions that will put the economy back together.

International, International, International

The most fundamental aspect of the current crisis is its international nature. Essentially, huge seas of capital are sloshing around the world and creating great instability in the process. Trust in financial markets is hurt by the general instability and the particular abuses.

Carefully designed international regulations could increase transparency and accountability without squelching capital movement dramatically. The problem is that, when one country imposes such controls, capital can move to another country with great speed. International coordination is clearly desirable. Unfortunately, there is not enough trust for that either.

Robert Samuelson identifies the three layers of the crisis (consumer, finance, and international trade) that must be solved simultaneously. The current US government responses focus on the first two problems. On the third, there is little intelligent government response. In fact, we are likely to see increased protectionism, such as through the "Buy America" steel provision in the recent stimulus package.

The Obama interest in infrastructure development is a good first step towards addressing the need to be internationally competitive but we will not have addressed the challenges, and opportunities, of our economic moment until we look more seriously at international financial and economic structures.

What Do Financial Markets Tell Us about Ourselves?

Financial markets are like the mirror of mankind, revealing every hour of every working day the way we value ourselves and the resources of the world around us.

It is not the fault of the mirror if it reflects our blemishes as clearly as our beauty.

(Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money)

What do you think the financial crisis is telling us?

Community Organizing in Government

Obama's background as a community organizer is showing itself in his governing style. Today, for instance, (1) I received an e-mail from the Obama camp with a video responding to the prolific community discussion on health care found on the change.gov website. The e-mail talked about the importance of transparency and engagement and still refers to Obama, at times, as "Barack." Very heimish (warm, friendly). (2) Additionally, Obama took the opportunity of his meeting today with the National Governor's Association to ask for their feedback about how to spend stimulus money:

The meeting with the governors was "unprecedented," said Gov. Edward Rendell (D) of Pennsylvania, in that it was the first time a transition team for an incoming administration reached out to state governors to ask their help in crafting a national agenda. Forty-three of 50 states are facing serious deficits.

It looks like we have our first "information age" president.

The Nation-State and Global Integration

A few questions about strains on the power and efficacy of the nation-state:

(a) Does the global financial crisis call for international management of, say, currency exchange rates?

(b) Do globalization and the near-global triumph of capitalism undermine the greatest incentive (namely, international competition, respectively, among capitalist powers and between capitalist and non-capitalist powers) for leading capitalists to attend to the well-being of those who are not succeeding?

(c) Do global warming and other environmental strains demand an internationally-coordinated response that cannot entirely be managed by one nation-state?

My answer to all of these questions is 'yes' and points to the growing importance of international cooperation to solve many of our most pressing problems. I am not arguing that states are not strong. Neither am I am arguing necessarily for inter-governmental cooperation to solve these problems (although, such will sometimes be vital). Rather, I am arguing that a global perspective is becoming of greater importance. In due time, I believe that such a perspective will become the dominant paradigm, superseding the nation-state paradigm.

It is no coincidence that this pattern of integration presents itself as we find ourselves in a world in which everyone can be lifted out of poverty and in which universal education can be imagined. These goals can be achieved because (a) the global economy is sufficiently integrated to distribute basic goods, services, and skills to those in need of them, (b) globalization and the near-triumph of capitalism have led to a global economy in which human capital is of ever-greater economic value, and (c) environmental challenges force us to focus on how we can develop wealth without solely relying on materials. The best answers to this question are the development of technology and of human capital.

A Dollop of Buyer's Remorse

I'm not feeling too happy about Obama's advocacy of a GM bailout, especially since it's one of his first economic moves. I don't like the trends it symbolizes.

From newser.com (which reports on Krauthammer and Brooks):

American prosperity relies on creative destruction—the failure of nonviable companies and their replacement by defter rivals. The government endeavors to protect the worker in periods of transition, writes David Brooks in the New York Times, but not the firms themselves. That’s why the auto-industry bailout is a bad idea: Extending the life of the Big Three means preserving their unworkable business models.

The financial bailout ensured that the system itself continued to function, Brooks writes, but “a federal cash infusion will not infuse wisdom into management” at GM, Chrysler and Ford. Charles Krauthammer, in the Washington Post, agrees, writing that the Detroit bailout underlines philosophical differences between Republicans and Democrats: “In this crisis, we agree to suspend the invisible hand of Adam Smith— but not in order to be crushed by the heavy hand of government.

End of an Era: Free Market Orthodoxy Is No Longer Ascendant

Agree or not, the following exchange signals the end of a 28-year era of American politics in which free market orthodoxy defined the terms of domestic debate:

“You had the authority to prevent irresponsible lending practices that led to the subprime mortgage crisis. You were advised to do so by many others,” said Representative Henry A. Waxman of California, chairman of the committee. “Do you feel that your ideology pushed you to make decisions that you wish you had not made?”

Mr. Greenspan conceded: “Yes, I’ve found a flaw. I don’t know how significant or permanent it is. But I’ve been very distressed by that fact.”

Read more.

GEOPOLITICS, FINANCE, AND EDUCATION

In the upcoming weeks, world leaders will meet to begin to consider a new financial architecture for the world.

If they fail to found a cooperative framework, the threat of protectionism, economic decline, and the associated political challenges (which would not be small, and could be frightening) will be our biggest challenges.

If they succeed (as I suspect that they will), we will have taken a noticeable step to a more integrated world in which conflict between large nations becomes somewhat less likely. Challenges would still remain in that regard, to be sure, not least the endurance of petrodictatorships. Still, new issues will, after such a success, begin to come to the fore. I believe that one of the boldest dividing lines in a more stable (I take small group terrorism into account here.), integrated world will be the divide between the information technologically-able and the informational technologically-challenged. The would increase the importance of education, relative to international relations, as a defining issue for geopolitical stability.

What do you think?

"Spread the Wealth Around"

A propos of Obama's comment to a voter that he intends to 'spread the wealth around,' I would suggest that that comment will not prove as incendiary as it may have in an earlier age. For the time being (at least) the federal bailout has broken the US taboo of respect for individual responsibility. In a financial climate that reminds us of our interdependence, the concept that helping those in modest circumstances may be (even financially) beneficial to us all (expressed by Obama, though not as widely reported as his less politic, and less rigorous, statement, above) is not as seditious as it once might have seemed.

Intimations of a New Global Order

David Ignatius:

The new interventionism isn't so much socialist as it is Confucian -- a belief that a public-private partnership of the wise ones will get us out of the mess. And if it's any consolation, the Chinese are becoming more like us, even as we are becoming more like them. . . .

One hopeful sign last week was that the Chinese were moving toward private ownership, even as America and Europe were moving away from it. The Chinese government announced a new rural policy aimed at allowing millions of farmers to own the land they have been working. This would create a huge new reserve of private wealth in China, which could power domestic spending and growth. [Read more.]

A focal point of this new order, which I will explain further later, will be the development of the economic potential of the mass of producers. The innovation will be that such focus will be justified in terms of the promotion of prosperity, not just through appeals to social justice.

A few suggested conversation topics:
What positive effects can you imagine coming out of the crisis?
Can democratic institutions respond to crisis with coherence?
What aspect of the financial crisis would you focus on if you were Paulson?

Iceland and China

. . . the government of Iceland is presiding over a massive default by all the country's major banks. This troubling development points not only to an even more painful recession than anticipated, but also to the urgent need for international coordination to avoid something worse: all-out financial warfare.

. . . Iceland's promise to guarantee domestic depositors while reneging on guarantees to foreigners may be just a first step. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown's decision last week to sue Iceland over this issue may escalate the crisis. The use of counterterrorist legislation to take over Icelandic bank assets and operations in the United Kingdom also has a potentially dramatic symbolic effect. (Peter Boone and Simon Johnson, "The Next World War? It Could Be Financial." The Washington Post, 10/12/08.)

There's a reason that the gestures by the US government have not sufficed to reassure financial markets: the US is no longer the unquestioned command and control center of the global economy. We have to take the imaginative leap that integrates rising developing nations into our paradigm of economic management.

Peter Boone and Simon Johnson, in today's Washington Post, point to the depth of the financial crisis in bracing detail but, unsurprisingly, fall back on nostrums about the power of the "the world's leading financial powers -- at a minimum, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany" to reassure markets. Am I naive, or does US to China (between $1.5 and $2 trillion, I believe) qualify China as an important financier? How can anyone be sure that the Chinese, given their own fragile politics, will support any plan that comes from the West in a time of financial crisis?

A Broader Perspective on the Financial Crisis

The response to this financial crisis will be both economic and geopolitical. The Great Depression called into question the stark laissez-faire approach of the industrial revolution and its aftermath. The US stepped into global leadership after World War II by leading the construction of a global financial system that has done a very good job at promoting stability and growth.

The change that we are facing now is not essentially about investment banks, mortgage lenders, or homebuyers. Rather, it reflects the transition of the global economy to an era in which the US cannot be the only hub at the center of the wheel.

C. Fred Bergsten and Arvind Subramanian, in today's Washington Post, help to explain how this process underlies the more obvious signs of crisis.

Beyond the short term, countries will need to develop a cooperative framework to prevent and resolve such crises, most urgently within Europe. There is inherent tension as finance becomes global but its regulation remains national. The current crisis originated in the United States but was importantly affected by massive savings surpluses in some countries and the resulting surfeit of liquidity, which drove down interest rates and encouraged irresponsible lending here. Those international imbalances were in turn partly caused by misaligned exchange rates. Global oversight of both financial regulation and currencies can no longer be neglected.

One way to understand this is that China, most importantly, has artificially increased its capital reserves by preventing its currency from appreciating to its correct market value. China sells more exports than it otherwise would, and buys fewer imports than it otherwise would. Ultimately, the Chinese money does make it back to the US, but in the form of payments for Treasury Bills (This is due to a Chinese concern about inflation as well as a concern that excess capital would lead to social unrest and/or uncontrollable wealth flows that could weaken Communist Party control.).

Simply put, it seems to me that the net consequence is that cash comes to the US Treasury rather than to, among others, US producers. The cash in the Treasury was then ultimately lent out at low interest rates, creating investment opportunities in a society in which wages were not appreciated significantly (because of, among other reasons, the fact that American products were not easily sold to countries that have maintained a high exchange rate of local currency to dollars).

The predicament in which consumers cannot afford appreciating assets in reminiscent of the pre-Depression years in which consumers could not afford proliferating production. The similar increase in consumer credit is an unsurprising result.

Essentially, a change in global financial architecture is needed, not only for the reasons mentioned by the authors, above, but also so that the US can benefit most fully from concentrating on the development of its human capital, the long-term sine qua non for economic growth and political stability.

Concerns about political stability should not be minimized. The inherent tensions between communities constituting a democratic society are generously lubricated by growing wealth. The sense of chaos that can percolate through a society in the absence of such a scenario lends itself to exploitation by authoritarian-minded regimes. I do not think that the US is on the brink of such a scenario but the 20th century taught us well that farflung events can have a dramatic impact on our society.

Irresponsibility in Government

There are many criticisms that can be made about the consequences to the market of a federal bailout (see George Will today, for instance) but I am certainly willing to take the lead of Paulson, Warren Buffett, etc.

Nonetheless, I do not credit most House Republicans with being thoughtful free marketeers. The sequence of events over the last week suggests that many had trouble understanding the crisis and that political calculation was predominant aspect of their thinking, despite the serious crisis. Michael Gerson points out, additionally, the many Democrats made similar calculations and that Pelosi's prevote speech was exceptionally poorly considered.

All in all, I agree with Gerson's estimation that the current political crisis in more frightening than the economic crisis:

America is left with one portion of one branch of government that does not seem to work. House Democrats seem temperamentally incapable of building genuine consensus on issues that matter. Many House Republicans seem so alienated from the mainstream policy consensus that they inhabit a different world. One wonders if any emergency short of an invasion of American territory would unite them. Even then, Pelosi would probably blame the conflict on cowboy diplomacy, House Republicans would talk of the natural fruits of McGovernism, and the vote on declaring war would be close.

Though some compromise may eventually be passed, it is now clear that American political elites have lost the ability to quickly respond to a national challenge by imposing their collective will. What once seemed like politics as usual now seems more like the crisis of the Articles of Confederation -- a weak government populated by small men. And this must be more frightening to a world dependent on American stability than any bank failure.

Cincinnatus

Perhaps you know the Roman legend of Cincinnatus, the farmer-cum-dictator, who led his country in war and then returned, peaceably to the plow afterwards.

Our modern day Cincinnates (if you will) are Bernanke and Paulson who, though not dictators, are to be expected to control large amounts of capital with great financial consequence. The stark image of these two men crafting policy of great import, with limited outside involvement, reminds me of a section of Friedman's book: "China for a Day." In that section, Friedman daydreams about the potentialities of American creativity that would be unleashed if our government, fractured and unfocused as it is, could call for the bold changes in energy policy that China regularly has, at least, begun to do.

The scenario laid out by David Brooks (see below) could have been predicted by Aristotle, who diagnosed the weaknesses of democracy. Will our Cincinnatus, and their associated class of financial mandarins, go their way quietly when their work is done?


Two predictions:

1) Strong financial authority, provided to elites of that system, will supersede some of the authority of our populist leaders, caught up in the politics of fundraising and reelection. It will also lead to the responsible investing in America's energy, infrastructure, and human capital that is so vital right now.

2) Centralization inevitably leads to abuses of power. Expect, in say, ten years' time, a movement to arise to confront the smugness of a self-satisfied financial elite that, if all goes well, will have saved the country from a host of economic pitfalls.


Finally, the Brooks quote:

And lo and behold, a new center and a new establishment is emerging.

The Paulson rescue plan is one chapter. But there will be others. Over the next few years, the U.S. will have to climb out from under mountainous piles of debt. Many predict a long, gray recession. The country will not turn to free-market supply-siders. Nor will it turn to left-wing populists. It will turn to the safe heads from the investment banks. . . .

The government will be much more active in economic management (pleasing a certain sort of establishment Democrat). Government activism will provide support to corporations, banks and business and will be used to shore up the stable conditions they need to thrive (pleasing a certain sort of establishment Republican). Tax revenues from business activities will pay for progressive but business-friendly causes — investments in green technology, health care reform, infrastructure spending, education reform and scientific research.

The Financial Crisis and Isolationism

A friend today said to me, "Maybe we should be willing to spend extra money to buy American-made products. The Chinese are going to fund our new government intervention in the economy but we should be taking care of ourselves."

I think that this sentiment is exactly misleading. Our weaknesses are tied, in part, to our failure to recognize that we need to market ourselves to the world. Turning inward would be a temporary salve but would actually be the harbinger of gradual economic and political decline.